jlun319
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Name: Joseph
Country: Hong Kong
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Birthday: 3/19/1983
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Interests: Drums, Piano, Luxury life
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Member Since: 12/14/2004

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Sunday, October 05, 2008

Bankers are all greedy, irresponsible ppl

咁大隻蛤乸隨街跳?
(明報)10月5日 星期日 05:05


【明報專訊】儘管雷曼的名字已成歷史,但其迷你債券所引發的紛爭尚未平息。外間討論的要點如下﹕

一) 迷你債券條款的複雜性

二) 銷售銀行前線職員涉嫌誤導投資者

三) 監管機構不力

因篇幅所限,我會集中討論首兩點。

迷你債券本身多是三到五年期,銀行有權提早贖回。票息是固定的,惟若合約列明的數間公司(一般為六至七家)中任何一間出現信用事件(credit event),以後便再沒有票息。要注意的是,信用事件除了破產外,也包括重組、拒絕履行甎絕薑銗I、不能支付(每一項都有詳細法律條文,在此不贅)。這 些公司大都是普羅大眾熟悉的企業如中銀、和黃等。

複雜的金融衍生工具

債券的發行者不是雷曼,而是一家由雷曼成立的公司(Special Purpose Vehicle,簡稱SPV),受雷曼擔保。當投資者買入迷你債券,實際金額會繳到SPV。SPV把錢用來購買其他資產作為迷你債券的抵押品。而這次買的 抵押品就是近來聞者色變的「債務抵押債券」(Collateralized Debt Obligation,簡稱CDO)。此外,雷曼和SPV之間做了一系列的金融衍生工具去對冲SPV跟迷你債券投資者對賭的風險。這樣,SPV把風險轉移 至雷曼,並用CDO和這些衍生工具的現金流來支付迷你債券的利息。因有雷曼作擔保,SPV亦可以取得較高的信貸評級。

雷曼跟SPV間的衍生工具有很多,最重要的就是「最先違約一籃子互換」(First-to-default basket swap,簡稱 FTD)。迷你債券的條款是在一籃子的公司內,只要任何一家發生信用事件,迷你債券每期未付的息率便會作廢。FTD 的用途正就是把這一風險對冲。FTD的價值除了籃子內每一間公司的個別「信用違約互換」(Credit default swap)價值外,還要考慮所有公司的「交差違約相關性」(cross default correlation),亦即籃子內某一公司和其他每一家公司一併發生信用事件的相關性。

FTD在銀行間的流通量極低,每一家銀行用不同的金融模型(financial model),或用不同的交差違約相關性,得出的FTD價值便會有很大的差異。亦由於流通性低,一般人難以理解,故銀行跟客戶交易時便可獲取更高利潤。說 到底,對銀行來說,賣一紙FTD的利潤肯定比買賣普通股票的交易收費大得多。

筆者無意再深入討論,以免趕走大部分讀者。我想表達的是,若把迷你債券拆件研究,分拆出來的仍然是一些非常複雜的衍生工具。迷你債券持有者除了間接投資於高風險的CDO外,同時亦做了像FTD這些只應是專業人士才涉獵的金融工具。

迷你債券有不同系列,息率和掛勾的公司也有不同。讓我們設定其中一系列的息率為五厘。行內人研究時會把這結構產品拆開成個別容易理解和交易的組件,然後計算每一組件的價值,看如何得出這個五厘的息率。分析如下﹕

投資於CDO的息率(A)

加FTD的價值(B)

減銀行的利潤(雷曼和其他銷售銀行)(C)

行內人士估計,(A)加(B)的息率可高達九厘。投資於CDO的利息應該頗低,原因是其高評級(當然,現在大家已經知道這些評級完全未能反映現 實!)所以大部分的利息應是來自FTD的價值。正因為迷你債券內隱藏着的FTD條文,投資者有機會喪失利息,對其不利,故他們理應獲得比一般債券為高的票 息,作為補償。

但為何投資者只得五厘票息?答案在於雷曼和其他銷售銀行的利潤(C)。這四厘息差怎樣分配,很難言明,肯定的是雙方均獲利甚豐。以上息率的分析只是筆者和業內朋友的討論跟推測,但相信與事實相差不遠。

現在因雷曼破產,作為SPV的交易對家,與其交易不能繼續,迷你債券便要終止。SPV被迫賤賣抵押品償還投資者的本金,但CDO因市價大跌而遠遠不足以抵償。雷曼本是SPV擔保人,但因其倒閉,故未能作出擔保,引發出這次事件。

產品複雜銀行利潤高

在銷售銀行方面,他們不是債券發行人,而只負責向投資者推銷產品。理論上不用承擔市場風險。現在輿論集中批評分行的銷售員涉隱瞞產品風險,甚至只向 散戶解釋迷你債券只是另一種息率較高的定期存款。但問題是每一個客戶也有簽署文件,列明所買產品的性質。銀行財雄勢大,有自家的金融法律專才準備有關合 約,細節一定是保護銀行方面,免去因客人投資損失所帶來的索償。就算有確切證據顯示有銷售員刻意誤導,但白紙黑字的合約才是法律依據。故我甚懷疑有關銀行 最終會否賠償給客戶。

每一家銀行也有部門和程序去審查產品是否適合不同客戶。理論上風險高而結構複雜的只會售予機構投資者或私人銀行的富有客戶(有關私人銀行客戶是否擁 有較高金融產品知識而適合投資較複雜產品是另一話題,有機會再討論)。普通散戶只宜投資簡單的產品。有些銀行經內部審查,決定迷你債券因結構過繁而沒有向 自己的零售客戶推銷。匯豐便是一例(註﹕匯豐是次只提供信託服務,不是銷售銀行之一)。但上文提過,愈複雜的產品,銀行的利潤便愈高。零售銀行客量龐大, 有銀行為了增加盈利,便向大眾市民推銷這些產品。他們不用承受市場風險,卻要蒙受因名譽受損所帶來的長遠負面影響。現在迷你債券違約,民眾矛頭均指向這些 銷售銀行。可以預計,市民對他們已失去信心,往後可說生意難做了。

另一問題是,分行職員可能只接受過很有限的理論訓練,對產品認識不足。「FTD」,「交差違約相關性」等這些專有名詞已經不甚了了,向普羅大眾解釋這些概念更是從何說起呢?

投資者方面,社會反應傾向同情他們。有大量報道,說很多人大半生積蓄就在這次事件中付諸流水。筆者絕對相信當中有人受到嚴重誤導,以為自己只是做了定期儲蓄,而定期的條款是那數間公司(不包括雷曼)不會倒閉。在此深表同情。

先做好風險管理工作

但我不相信遊行請願的數百人,全部都屬上述例子。債券交易需要開設證券戶口,故很多投資者在簽約前應該知道自己買的是債券。債券投資一個最基本的概 念就是,若發債者倒閉,投資者是不會拿回全部本金的。這次事件不是因為迷你債券票息釐定的複雜條款所引至的風險問題,而是因為雷曼倒閉令發債行(SPV) 清盤。若這一批不是迷你債券而是由雷曼發行和擔保的普通債券,投資者面對的會是相同後果。

再往深一層分析,當發債行破產,債券持有人便有權從變賣雷曼剩餘資產中獲得賠償,通常為本金的一小部分。但這批迷你債券是以CDO作為抵押,我相信 大部分投資者不知道這個事實。所以持有人在合約條款中便只能從賤賣這批CDO中獲得賠償。但CDO在這次金融風暴中已大幅貶值,我預計賠償金額數目在未來 數月也不會有結果。筆者沒有數據可以比較,不知這批抵押CDO的價值和雷曼剩餘的資產價值孰高孰低,但相信兩者皆意味投資者在法律上所獲的賠償不會太多。

不要把所有雞蛋放進同一籃子已是老生常談,更何况是同一隻有機會本金盡失的債券?筆者有些朋友雖沒有買入雷曼迷你債券,卻有「重注」於其他的公司債券。現在到期日未至,價格卻大幅下跌,買賣差價擴闊,當感如坐針氈,寢食難安了。

投資者亦應自我警惕,為何一項「定期」會比其他定期高息?把自己的血汗錢交予他人前,是否應該詳細問清楚所有條款?我有一想法,這些迷你債券息率 (舉例說五厘)只比普通定期略高一至兩厘,可能大部分投資者不會覺得有何不妥。但若把銀行(雷曼和銷售銀行)從中所賺的暴利放回去,息率動輒可達9厘。那 時投資者才會覺察﹕「點解有咁大隻蛤乸隨街跳?」現在他們就是為了少許額外利息令本金蒙受損失,着實不值。

作為一般市民,若真要做高風險投資,可以買二、三線,甚至四、五線股票。至少容易明白,交易費用亦廉宜。何必硬要買一些自己也搞不懂的炸彈,同時又 被銀行濫收高昂費用呢?迷你債券只是眾多金融炸彈中已經爆破的一個。投資者應該積極去清楚了解其他的投資項目有什麼風險。無論是accumulator或 比較簡單的外匯掛勾定期,以至一些連名字也叫不出的「高回報」產品,與其依賴監管機構,不如自己做好風險管理的工作。


Saturday, September 27, 2008

人生,好像要為理想做過點事情, 才叫無憾!

以前聽Beyond d 歌好似無mud特別

看完"駒歌"後, 好像有feel左很多


Wednesday, August 13, 2008

Turning Point

一位中學同學突然由IT轉到做Cadet Pilot,真係好爆

回想自己的路途,前幾年還可以,但最近好像平凡了一點

生命如何可以再“爆“一點????

Seems time for a drastic change




Monday, August 04, 2008

Confessions of Investment Banking

Investment Bankers 是否一班只想賺錢的無夢青年????????

是一個很簡單, 又唔使用腦的行業. 點解d人成日以為自己做Ibank好勁???

以下是我見過寫得最簡單直接的描述....but where do I go from here?



What Investment Bankers actually do
Investment bankers are agents. We don’t create anything and we don’t buy anything; we just sell things that aren’t ours to begin with. And we make a lot of money doing that, thank you very much. If the business world were like Entourage, bankers would be the agents, private equity firms and large companies would be the studios, and companies would be the actors and movies. Private equity firms buy and sell companies. Studios buy and sell actors and movies. Bankers make introductions and try to sell things. Agents make introductions and sell their clients.

Investment Banking: High-Price Items, High Commissions

Imagine the average used car salesman.  If his average selling price is $15,000, he’ll have to sell a lot of cars to make a decent amount of money - or move up to higher priced cars.

A real estate agent, by contrast, might sell houses in the $500,000 to millions range.  Sure, the percentage fee is lower than what the used car salesman might get, but since the total dollar value is so much higher, it’s easier to make a lot.

Now picture the investment banker.  He sells companies for millions, hundreds of millions, billions, or even zillions of dollars.  Even with a 0.1% commission, that’s a lot of money.

And for smaller deals (e.g. under $1 billion), the commission is usually more like 1% rather than 0.1%.

High Margins Are Easy With No Expenses

Ok, but what about all those other people in financial services who work with a lot of money but don’t make a lot of money?

So now we arrive at the second reason why investment bankers make so much money: the margins.

Sure, commercial bankers deal with a lot of money as well.  What passes through their hands every day has a lot of 000’s on the end, but the key difference is that their margins are just not as high because their commissions are lower and their expenses are higher.

You can’t exactly convince someone depositing $1 million in a bank account to give you 1%, at least not without the use of weapons.

Investment Banks: People Are The Only Expense

Banks, by contrast, have very little in the way of real expenses.  There is no Cost Of Goods Sold; there is no factory needed to make products.  All you need for an M&A deal is 4 people and an office.

Investment banks’ only ongoing, non-personnel expense is office maintenance.  Oh, and all that ink to create large stacks of pitchbooks for every meeting.

Travel?  Food and hotel expenses?  For a deal, they are charged back to the client.

And even if they weren’t, next to a multi-million dollar fee, these expenses are insignificant.

Thus, investment bankers make a lot of money because they sell things for huge amounts of money while taking a generous commission and having hardly any expenses.

What about others in finance?

This Seems Too Good To Be True, How Do They Do It?

Mostly by artificially limiting the number of people who can actually break into the industry.  Wall Street is a very small place and it’s no coincidence that such a highly lucrative industry would want to remain small and highly lucrative.

Do you actually need an Ivy League education and 4.0 GPA to do a finance job?  No.

But making it really, really difficult to get an investment banking job is a good way both to limit how many people break in and raise the prestige (and pay) of the industry.

Will It Last?

These are 2 separate questions: will private equity and hedge fund managers continue to get paid so well, and will investment bankers continue to get paid so well.

In the old days, the “2″ part of the “2 and 20″ fee structure was intended to give investors a way to “keep the lights on” before any of their investments paid off.  It was never intended to generate more cash than actual returns on investments.

And indeed, in a recent survey, 57% of pension managers say this structure is “unsustainable.”

But who will be the first to accept significantly lower fees?  Raise your hand.  Yeah, that’s what I thought.

On the investment banking side, some of the fee structures (e.g. 7% for IPOs) are dated as well and some of the “products,” such as sellside M&A, are often commodities.  Clients should not be paying millions of dollars for commodity services.

Fees at these levels should not last but they likely will last because there is very little competition in the form of other banks willing to undercut and charge less.  No one wants to be the first guy in the room to make 1% on an IPO rather than the usual 7%.



Tuesday, July 08, 2008

最近, 每天都感覺自己是為了meet別人的expectation而活

做每件事, 都是為了完成一個task, 而取得所謂的成功感

幾時才能有勇氣, 有機會做一些自己想做的事!



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